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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.O. Box: 3243 Tel.: (251-11) 5513 822 Fax: (251-11) 5519 321  
Email: [situationroom@africa-union.org](mailto:situationroom@africa-union.org)

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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL  
1087<sup>TH</sup> MEETING (VIRTUAL)

1 JUNE 2022  
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

**STATEMENTS DELIVERED DURING THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON THE  
SITUATION IN THE SAHEL**

**DÉCLARATIONS PRONONCÉES LORS DE LA RÉUNION DU CONSEIL DE PAIX ET DE SÉCURITÉ  
SUR LA SITUATION AU SAHEL**



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**I. COMMISSIONER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND PEACE AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT  
OF THE AFRICAN UNION**

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*Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for  
Political Affairs and Peace and Security*

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- **Your Excellency Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of Congo and Chairperson of the AU PSC for the month of June;**
- **Excellencies, Members of the AU Peace and Security Council;**
- **Distinguished Representative of the United Nations Office to the African Union;**
- **Representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the African Union;**
- **Ladies and Gentlemen;**

**Let me start by congratulating my Brother, Ambassador Willy as Chair of the Peace and Security Council for the Month of June and assure him of PAPS commitment to the successful execution of his mandate.**

**Excellencies;**

1. Since the last meeting of the Council relating to the Follow-up on Countries in Transition, which took place on 14 April, 2022, the situation within the Sahel region has remained challenged by complex political and security upheavals. Record increase in violent extremism, urban violence and organized crimes, surge in kidnappings for ransom, with precipitated attacks on military and security forces have been on an upsurge. The situation has been further compounded by political stalemate stemming from elongated transition processes.
2. Our meeting today is of critical importance because of some key issues:
  - the need to address the prolonged and disruptive political transitions in the Sahel region, especially in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea, ahead of the planned ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit.
  - the imperative to deliberate on the threats posed by regional terrorism, especially the complex and deteriorating security situation in the aftermath of the withdrawal of Mali from all organs of the G5 Sahel, including G5 Sahel Joint Force,
  - and the necessity to examine increased threats to regional investments, integration and cooperation.

3. The Sahel region over the years has captured global and regional attention due to rising and expanding terrorism, increased economic and migration challenges, complex political transitions, negative impact of climate change and the proliferation of intervening stakeholders which has helped slow down progress.
4. The political situation in the region, especially in Mali and Burkina Faso has remained unstable and largely characterized by governance deficits, stalled transitions, structural and institutional vulnerabilities, political exclusion, eroding state legitimacy and social disorder. After over two years since the military takeover in Mali, there is still no clear and acceptable Transition Roadmap on the return to constitutional order. Similar challenges are faced in Burkina Faso and Guinea.
5. Most significant, is the security and diplomatic tensions between the Transition Authorities in Mali and France, as well as with other European Partners, operating in Mali and the Sahel region since 2013; a high point in this Franco-Malian fracas is the withdrawal of the French Barkhane and Takuba Forces from Mali, and the recent cancellation and denunciation of Defence and Military Accords with France and European Partners by the Malian Transition Government. On the other hand, the recent withdrawal of Mali from the G5 Sahel poses a critical concern which could engender significant operational and tactical gaps within the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the broader Sahel region.

#### **Excellencies;**

6. According to some key statistics from the 2022 Global Terrorism Index, Sub-Saharan Africa emerged as global epicenter of terrorism, with 48% of global terrorism deaths, while the Sahel was earmarked as home to the world's fastest growing and most-deadly terrorist groups. In addition, it identified the Islamic State (IS), which is actively operational in the Sahel as the world's deadliest terror group in 2021. And they are capable of using advanced technologies including drones, GPS systems and encrypted messaging services to perpetuate fear and destabilize the region.
7. In response, the AU Commission has deployed a number of initiatives some of which are outlined below:
  - i. In the ardent aspiration to bring about strategic and innovation change in the region, and under the auspices of the AU Commission Chairperson and UN Secretary General, the AU, UN, ECOWAS and G5 Sahel are currently undertaking a Joint Strategic Assessment on Governance and Security in the Sahel. The process which will be led by the former President of Niger, H.E Mahamadu Issoufou, is expected to provide actionable recommendations on structural, governance and security vulnerabilities with the aim of ensuring impact, resilience and sustainability.

- ii. The operationalization of the Transition Monitoring Mechanisms in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso, as joint framework in providing requisite support and ensuring a swift return to Constitutional order is equally ongoing;
- iii. Expected implementation of key decisions from the recently concluded AU Extraordinary Summit on Humanitarian Action, Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG).

**Excellencies, Esteemed Members of the Council;**

8. In Conclusion, let me reiterate some key issues coming out of the Malabo Extraordinary Summit and to which we are invited to pay attention:
  - i. The ongoing complex challenges, particularly gaps in governance and convergence of vulnerabilities and security challenges, including terrorism and violent extremism, the surge of foreign fighters and mercenaries on the region cannot be tackled by Member States working in silos. Concerted and collective responses are compelling if we are to effectively address these threats;
  - ii. It remains evident that prolonged political transitions tend to be disruptive and engender instability and underdevelopment within Member States, thus the urgent need for intensified collective efforts with ECOWAS in ensuring completion of agreed and practical timeframe on the current transitions in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso;
  - iii. The vital need for increased investments in regional governance, security and socio-economic mechanisms, for the advancement of regional integration and cooperation, as well as the effective collaboration and coordination of regional bodies in the fight against violent extremism.
9. Excellencies, please allow me to hand over to the High Representative of MISAHEL for the briefing on the Situation in the Sahel;

**I thank you.**

## II. MISSION DE L'UNION AFRICAINE POUR LE MALI ET LE SAHEL (MISAHEL) - ENGLISH

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*Briefing by the High Representative, Head of MISAHEL*

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- **Your Excellency, Mr. President of the Council;**
- **Your Excellency, Ladies and Gentlemen Ambassadors, Members of the Council;**
- **Your Excellency, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security;**
- **Distinguished guests;**
- **Ladies and Gentlemen;**

1. On April 14, we met for the 1076th meeting of the PSC on Transitions in Africa. At that time, I noted the particularly difficult situation in Mali, due to the absence of an agreement with ECOWAS. The situation in Burkina Faso is marked by growing insecurity and an acute humanitarian crisis. As for Guinea, the situation remains complex due to the existence of a number of uncertainties.

2. I would like to congratulate the Congolese Chair of the PSC for convening this meeting on the Sahel in June 2022 and commend it for its sound vision of the concerns related to developments in the Sahel. As the note submitted by the Commission to the members of the Council shows, since April 14, the fragility of most of the countries in crisis in the Sahel has worsened, especially in terms of security, where the deterioration is observed practically from day to day. This meeting therefore enables the members of the Council to update themselves on the situation in the region in order to take the full measure of it and to envisage, consequently, vigorous and resolute actions to help face it.

**Mr. Chairman,**

3. At the political level, in Mali, it is necessary to reach an agreement with ECOWAS and consequently to obtain the lifting of the economic and financial sanctions in force since January 9, in order to relieve the populations who are the first victims. By easing the tension in relations between Mali and ECOWAS, this agreement will create the conditions for a return to constitutional legality through the adoption of a timetable of activities leading to credible elections at the end of the transition period. The agreement with ECOWAS should also free up energy for the peace process and facilitate the holding of the high-level decision-making meeting announced for June 13.

4. To contribute to the conclusion of this agreement, we are continuing our good offices within the framework of the Local Transition Monitoring Committee, which brings together the representatives in Bamako of the AU, the UN and ECOWAS, as well as the ambassadors of Nigeria and Ghana in Mali, to assist the stakeholders, in particular the transition authorities. In this regard, the recent meetings we have had with the country's highest authorities, in

particular the President of the Transition and the Prime Minister, give us hope that they are committed, as evidenced by the request for facilitation from H.E. Faure Gnassingbé, to make further efforts to achieve a favorable outcome. This meeting is an opportunity for the Council to make a decisive contribution to the resolution of this crisis by strongly supporting these initiatives with a view to a successful outcome, including the lifting of economic and financial sanctions, at the end of the next summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government scheduled for 4 June 2022.

5. In Guinea, the 36-month transition period adopted by the authorities is rejected by a significant portion of the political class and civil society organizations united in the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC). These political and civic forces plan to organize demonstrations on public roads in the near future, despite the ban on demonstrations imposed by the current government. The emerging standoff is worrisome given the serious violence that has plagued political demonstrations in Guinea in recent years.

6. In Burkina Faso, the government is implementing the transition program, but the population is impatient for the security situation to improve. In addition, there are still calls for the full release of former President Roch Kaboré. These are mainly the MPP, the former ruling party, but also civil society organizations.

**Mr. President,**

7. The security situation in the Sahel is very worrying and will continue to deteriorate if nothing is done now. Attacks are almost daily against regular forces and civilians; the populations live in fear. For example, in Burkina Faso, about 50 civilians fleeing terrorists in Madjoari (eastern region) were cruelly murdered on May 25, 2022.

8. While the countries of the region and partners are making great efforts, the persistence of attacks with staggering casualty figures, particularly in the Liptako-Gouma region, demonstrates that these efforts are not yet sufficient to reverse the trend of actions by armed bandits and terrorist groups - mainly the Etat Islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) and the Groupe de Soutien à l'Islam et aux Musulmans (JNIM). Even more seriously, they are extending their actions to coastal countries such as Togo and Benin. In this context, the weakening of common mechanisms for fighting the terrorist hydra, such as the G5 Sahel, with the announcement of Mali's withdrawal, is not likely to facilitate coordination between the countries concerned. Mali remains central to this fight and I continue to believe that resolving the security crisis in Mali is essential to effectively combat insecurity at the regional level.

9. This task has become almost urgent given the consequences of this insecurity and many other factors such as climate change, poverty or the effects of the COVID 19 pandemic on the daily lives of the region's populations. Indeed, according to the latest report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), nearly 18 million people are threatened with famine in the Sahel, and 7.7 million children under the age of five are expected to suffer from malnutrition, including 1.8 million from severe malnutrition. In Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger, this would rise to alarming levels with nearly 1.7 million people experiencing emergency levels of food insecurity during the lean season (between June and August). The case of Burkina Faso is symptomatic in that, due to insecurity, there

are more than 1.8 million internally displaced persons in 277 host communities with multi-faceted needs (food, housing, health care, etc.).

10. Due to insecurity, more than 8.1 million people have fled their homes and have only limited access to basic services. For example, more than 10,000 schools are closed in Sahelian countries, including more than 4,000 in Burkina Faso, putting children at risk of exploitation and abuse; health care is equally affected, with 590 clinics still unusable in the central Sahel alone.

11. To address the situation, the UN Secretary-General, after his visit to the Sahel in early May 2022, told the Security Council on May 19 that the UN would release \$30 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund to address urgent food security and nutrition needs in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad, bringing funding from the Fund to \$90 million. For its part, the European Union (EU) has granted approximately 240 million euros in humanitarian aid for the Sahel countries for the year 2022, in particular to assist displaced persons and the communities hosting them. I hope that the Malabo Summit, which addressed all these issues, will lead to a significant mobilization of the African Union for concrete, visible and urgent humanitarian actions in favor of the Sahel region.

12. Strong measures are needed, including the revitalization and adaptation without delay of existing security mechanisms such as the Algiers UFL, the Nouakchott Process, the Accra Initiative. The expression of greater solidarity by the AU and its member states towards the Sahel countries is a matter of responsibility, as the destabilization of the Sahel is a serious threat to peace and security in the West African region and beyond.

**I thank you.**



### III. MISSION DE L'UNION AFRICAINE POUR LE MALI ET LE SAHEL (MISAHEL) - FRENCH

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#### Briefing du Haut Représentant, Chef de la MISAHEL

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- Excellence, Monsieur le Président du Conseil ;
- Excellence, Mesdames et Messieurs les ambassadeurs, membres du Conseil ;
- Excellence, Monsieur le Commissaire Chargé des Affaires Politiques, Paix et Sécurité ;
- Distingués invités ;
- Mesdames et Messieurs ;

1. Le 14 avril dernier, nous étions réunis à l'occasion de la 1076<sup>ème</sup> réunion du CPS sur les Transitions en Afrique. Je relevais alors la situation particulièrement difficile au Mali, du fait de l'absence d'accord avec la CEDEAO. La situation au Burkina Faso est marquée par une insécurité grandissante et une crise humanitaire aiguë. Quant à la Guinée, la situation demeure complexe du fait de l'existence d'un certain nombre d'incertitudes.

2. Je voudrais féliciter la présidence congolaise du CPS de ce mois de juin 2022 qui a convoqué cette réunion sur le Sahel et la féliciter pour la justesse de sa vision quant aux préoccupations liées à l'évolution de la situation dans le Sahel. Comme le démontre la note soumise par la Commission aux membres du Conseil, depuis le 14 avril dernier, la fragilité de la plupart des pays en crise au Sahel s'est aggravée, surtout en matière de sécurité où la dégradation s'observe pratiquement de jour en jour. Cette réunion permet donc aux membres du Conseil, de se mettre à jour sur la situation de la région afin d'en prendre toute la mesure et d'envisager, en conséquence, des actions vigoureuses et résolues en vue de contribuer à y faire face.

**Monsieur le Président,**

3. **Sur le plan politique, au Mali**, il est nécessaire de trouver un accord avec la CEDEAO et d'obtenir par conséquent la levée des sanctions économiques et financières en vigueur depuis le 9 janvier, pour soulager les populations qui en sont les premières victimes. Par la décrispation qu'il apportera dans les relations entre le Mali et la CEDEAO, cet accord permettra de créer les conditions du retour à la légalité constitutionnelle à travers l'adoption d'un chronogramme des activités devant conduire à des élections crédibles au terme de la période de Transition. L'accord avec la CEDEAO devrait aussi permettre de libérer des énergies pour le processus de paix et faciliter la tenue de la réunion décisionnelle de haut niveau annoncé pour le 13 juin prochain.

4. Pour contribuer à la conclusion de cet accord, nous poursuivons nos bons offices dans le cadre du Comité Local de Suivi de la Transition qui regroupe les Représentants à Bamako

de l'UA, de l'ONU et de la CEDEAO ainsi que les ambassadeurs du Nigéria et du Ghana au Mali, pour aider les parties prenantes, en particulier les autorités de la Transition. A ce titre, les récentes rencontres que nous avons eues avec les plus hautes autorités du pays, notamment le Président de la Transition et le Premier ministre, nous permettent de fonder un espoir quant à l'engagement de celles-ci, matérialisé par ailleurs par la sollicitation de la facilitation de SEM Faure Gnassingbé, à fournir davantage d'efforts pour une issue favorable. La présente réunion est une opportunité pour le Conseil de contribuer de manière déterminante à la résolution de cette crise en appuyant fortement ces initiatives en vue d'un dénouement heureux, y compris la levée des sanctions économiques et financières, à l'issue du prochain sommet des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la CEDEAO annoncé pour le 04 juin 2022.

5. **En Guinée**, le délai de Transition de 36 mois adopté par les autorités est rejeté par une partie importante de la classe politique et des organisations de la société civile réunies au sein du Front National de Défense de la Constitution (FNDC). Ces forces politiques et citoyennes prévoient d'organiser bientôt des manifestations sur les voies publiques en dépit de l'interdiction de manifester décidée par le pouvoir en place. Le bras de fer qui se dessine est préoccupant compte tenu des graves violences qui ont émaillées les manifestations politiques en Guinée ces dernières années.

6. **Au Burkina Faso**, le gouvernement déroule le programme de la Transition, mais on observe une impatience de la population quant à l'amélioration de la situation sécuritaire. Par ailleurs, des voix s'élèvent toujours pour demander la libération totale de l'ancien Président Roch Kaboré. Il s'agit essentiellement du MPP, l'ancien parti au pouvoir, mais aussi des organisations de la société civile.

### **Monsieur le Président,**

7. La situation sécuritaire au Sahel est très préoccupante et continuera de se dégrader si rien n'est fait maintenant. Les attaques sont quasi-quotidiennes contre les forces régulières et les civils ; les populations vivent dans la peur. A titre d'exemple, au Burkina Faso, une cinquantaine de civils fuyant des terroristes à Madjoari (région de l'Est) ont été cruellement assassinés le 25 mai 2022.

8. Certes, les pays de la région et les partenaires fournissent beaucoup d'efforts, mais la persistance des attaques avec des chiffres ahurissants de victimes, en particulier dans la région du Liptako-Gouma démontre que lesdits efforts ne sont pas encore suffisants pour inverser la tendance face aux actions des bandits armés et des groupes terroristes – principalement l'Etat Islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) et le Groupe de Soutien à l'Islam et aux Musulmans (JNIM). Plus grave encore, ils étendent leurs actions vers les pays côtiers comme le Togo et le Bénin. Dans ce contexte, la fragilisation des mécanismes communs de lutte contre l'hydre terroriste comme le G5 Sahel, avec l'annonce du retrait du Mali, n'est pas de nature à faciliter la coordination entre les pays concernés. Le Mali reste central dans cette lutte et je continue de penser que la résolution de la crise sécuritaire au Mali est primordiale pour combattre efficacement l'insécurité à l'échelle régionale.

9. Cette tâche est quasiment devenue urgente compte tenu des conséquences de cette insécurité et bien d'autres facteurs comme le changement climatique, la pauvreté ou les

effets de la pandémie de COVID 19 sur le quotidien des populations de la région. En effet, selon le dernier rapport du bureau de coordination des affaires humanitaires de l'ONU (OCHA), près de 18 millions de personnes sont menacées de famine au Sahel, 7,7 millions d'enfants de moins de 5 ans devraient souffrir de malnutrition dont 1,8 million de malnutrition sévère. Au Burkina Faso, au Tchad, au Mali et au Niger, cela prendrait des niveaux alarmants avec près de 1,7 million de personnes qui connaîtront des niveaux d'urgence d'insécurité alimentaire pendant la période de soudure (entre juin et août). Le cas du Burkina Faso est symptomatique dans la mesure où, du fait de l'insécurité, on dénombre plus de 1,8 million de personnes déplacées internes réparties dans 277 communes d'accueil avec des besoins multiformes (alimentaires, en logements, soins de santé, etc.).

10. Du fait de l'insécurité, plus de 8,1 millions de personnes ont fui leur domicile et ne disposent que d'un accès limité aux services de base. A titre d'exemples : plus de 10 000 écoles sont fermées dans les pays du Sahel dont plus de 4000 au Burkina Faso, exposant ainsi les enfants aux risques d'exploitation et d'abus ; les soins de santé sont tout autant affectés, avec 590 dispensaires toujours inutilisables rien que dans le Sahel central.

11. Pour faire face à la situation, le Secrétaire général de l'ONU, après sa visite au Sahel au début du mois mai 2022 a déclaré devant le Conseil de sécurité le 19 mai que l'ONU allait débloquer 30 millions de dollars du Fonds central d'intervention d'urgence pour répondre aux besoins urgents en matière de sécurité alimentaire et de nutrition au Burkina Faso, au Mali, au Niger et au Tchad, portant ainsi à 90 millions de dollars le financement octroyé sur ce Fonds. En ce qui la concerne, l'Union européenne (UE) a accordé au titre de l'année 2022, une aide humanitaire d'environ 240 millions d'euros en faveur des pays du Sahel, notamment pour porter secours aux déplacés et aux communautés qui les accueillent. Je fonde l'espoir, à la faveur du sommet de Malabo qui a abordé toutes ces questions, d'une mobilisation conséquente de l'Union africaine pour des actions humanitaires concrètes, visibles et urgentes en faveur de la région du Sahel.

12. Il faut des mesures fortes, y compris la revitalisation et l'adaptation sans délais des mécanismes sécuritaires existants tels que l'UFL d'Alger, le Processus de Nouakchott, l'Initiative d'Accra. L'expression d'une solidarité plus marquée de l'UA et de ses Etats membres envers les pays du Sahel est une question de responsabilité, car la déstabilisation du Sahel est une menace grave à la paix et la sécurité sur la région Ouest-africaine et au-delà.

**Je vous remercie.**

#### IV. RÉPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI

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*Déclaration de S. E M. Abdi Mahamoud Eybe Ambassadeur de la République de Djibouti auprès de l'Éthiopie, Représentant Permanent auprès de l'Union Africaine et de la CEA*

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Excellence Monsieur Daniel Owassa Ambassadeur de la République du Congo Représentant Permanent auprès de l'UA et Président du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Union Africaine pour le mois de juin 2022.

Excellence Ambassadeur Bankole Adeoye, Commissaire aux Affaires Politiques, à la Paix et à la Sécurité.

Excellences Mesdames et Messieurs les Ambassadeurs membres du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Union Africaine.

Excellence Ambassadeur Mamane Sambo Sidikou, Haut Représentant de l'UA pour le Mali et Chef de la MISAHÉL.

**Monsieur le Président,  
Mesdames et Messieurs,**

Avant tout propos permettez-moi **Monsieur le Président** de vous féliciter pour l'accession de votre pays la République sœur du Congo à la présidence du CPS pour le mois de juin 2022 et vous assure d'ors et déjà du plein soutien de ma délégation tout au long de votre mandat.

Également je tiens à remercier les différents présentateurs pour leurs importantes communications.

La situation du Sahel que nous examinons aujourd'hui est très préoccupante. Le terrorisme et l'insécurité continuent de se propager, détruisant la vie de millions de personnes.

Les civils encore une fois sont les principales victimes de ces actes terroristes notamment les femmes et les enfants.

La situation humanitaire dans cette région se traduit par une insécurité alimentaire, une désintégration de communautés entières qui sont les conséquences directes de cette instabilité politique prolongée et qui ont un impact direct sur les jeunes qui se retrouvent sans opportunités et sans perspectives et qui au final se tournent vers la criminalité et les groupes terroristes qui les accueillent à bras ouverts.

**Monsieur le Président,**

Dans le cadre de ces crises politiques et sécuritaires prolongées dans cette région, la protection des plus vulnérables est devenue encore plus importante. Il est urgent pour les pays de la région du Sahel de redoubler leurs efforts pour faire respecter et protéger les droits de l'Homme.

Le défi qui se pose pour identifier les groupes terroristes parmi les communautés est unique.

C'est dans ce sens et pour une meilleure lutte contre ce fléau, il serait important d'impliquer les civils dans ces opérations de ciblage.

**Monsieur le Président,  
Mesdames et Messieurs,**

En ce qui concerne l'avenir du G5 Sahel, il reste incertain suite au retrait du Mali de l'organisation mais il s'agit toutefois d'un pas en arrière pour le Sahel.

**Monsieur le Président,**

Concernant les situations au Mali et au Burkina Faso et conformément aux décisions du Sommet de Malabo sur le terrorisme et les changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement qui vient de s'achever, il serait crucial que les parties prenantes de la région parviennent à un consensus sur la meilleure façon de mener à bien les transitions au Mali et au Burkina Faso, notamment en adoptant un calendrier de transition acceptable.

**Monsieur le Président,**

Mon pays la République de Djibouti, dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et l'extrémisme violent est convaincu qu'il est essentiel d'adopter une approche continentale et une collaboration commune pour relever les défis auxquels le Sahel est confronté.

C'est dans cette optique et pour un avenir propice dans la région du Sahel que ma délégation appui les recommandations suivantes :

1. Demande à la commission de mobiliser sérieusement des ressources pour l'opérationnalisation des mécanismes de suivi de la transition et l'organisation régulière des réunions des groupes internationaux de suivi et d'appui sur le Mali, la Guinée et le Burkina Faso afin de garantir un retour rapide à l'ordre constitutionnel.
2. Faciliter l'intégration des initiatives africaines en matière de sécurité au Sahel dans l'architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA) et demander à la Commission de prendre des mesures urgentes cohérentes en faveur des pays.
3. Demande à la Commission de s'impliquer davantage dans le soutien au développement économique et au programme de reconstruction post-conflit dans les pays du Sahel.

4. Salue les efforts de l'évaluation stratégique conjointe **UA-ONU-CEDEAO-G5 Sahel** sur la gouvernance et la sécurité au Sahel et appelle au soutien politique, financier et technique nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de l'initiative.
5. Appelle la Commission à travailler étroitement avec la CEDEAO sur le projet de déploiement de 3000 hommes.

**Je vous remercie de votre bienveillante attention.**

## V. REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA

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*Statement delivered by Ambassador Jainaba Jagne, Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Gambia to the African Union*

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H.E. Ambassador Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo to the African Union (AU) and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of June 2022, distinguished Council Members of the Peace and Security Council.

Allow me to congratulate Ambassador Owassa for assuming the Chair of PSC for the month of June and for considering such a timely and relevant topic of discussion considering the worrying security, political and humanitarian development in the Sahel. I also profoundly thank the briefers for their insightful briefing on the situation in the Sahel.

Chair, the rising insecurity, political volatility and tension combined with climatic and demographic pressures on the livelihoods of people in the region are aggravating the already dire humanitarian situation in the region. The Global Terrorism Index 2022 published in March 2022, indicated that there is continuing rise both in the number of attacks and of fatalities in the Sahel region. With such spike in attacks and fatalities, the Sahel is among the regions with countries most affected by terrorism in the continent due to frequent attack by the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al Qaeda-affiliated Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimeen (JNIM). Various factors account for these. These include weak capacity of security forces, absence of state presence in border areas, declining socio-economic condition and among others. In addition to these, is the expansion in operational capacity and geographic stretch of the two main terrorist groups operating in the region, the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al Qaeda-affiliated Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimeen (JNIM).

Chair, these challenges are further compounded by the heightened levels of political volatility, partly on account of the worsening security situation. Most of the countries within the region (Mali, Guinea, Chad, Burkina Faso) are affected by terrorism have experienced attempted military coups. Effective policy response to the growing threat of terrorism is further affected by the deepening tension of the international security partnership in the Sahel.

The operation of G5 Sahel Joint Force is affected by the diplomatic tensions in the Sahel involving both regional and international actors. In his 11 May 2022 Report on the G5 Sahel to the UN Security Council, UN Secretary General expressed his deep concern 'by the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the Sahel, as well as by the potentially debilitating effect that the uncertain political situation in Mali, Burkina Faso and beyond will have on efforts to further operationalize the G5 Sahel Joint Force and to address the underlying causes of instability and improve governance.'

The withdrawal of Mali from the G5 Sahel Joint Force on 15 May 2022 by the transitional authorities protesting against its exclusion from assuming the rotating presidency of G5 Sahel created security gap for counter terrorism in the region. The spike in insecurity on Mali's border with Burkina Faso and Niger and the recent terrorist attack in Burkina Faso is a case in point.

Chair, it is a grave concern the persistence of terrorist attacks, political crisis, and the accompanying deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Sahel. It is imperative therefore, to adopt a comprehensive approach that would address not only the immediate security challenges but also its underlying causes considering the multidimensional nature of the security and humanitarian challenges.

In that regard, I proffer the following recommendations for the Council's consideration:

- 1) To give greater attention to Preventive Diplomacy to address the underlying conditions and drivers of instability, such as underdevelopment, weak governance and climate change to prevent causes as well as impact of insecurity;
- 2) An assessment of the situation by the African Union and how to facilitate the resolution of the disagreement among countries of the G5 Sahel. This is critical to restore cohesion of members of the G5 Sahel and the effective functioning of the joint force;
- 3) the need for consensual timelines for the transitions between ECOWAS and the transitional Government Burkina Faso and Mali to usher in a solution and a sense of urgency of ending the adverse impact of this difference on the security situation in the region;
- 4) Considering the important role of G5 Sahel joint force, it is essential to initiate dialogue between the G5 Sahel joint force with Mali to reach a common ground to enhance cohesion and address the prevailing security gap caused by the withdrawal of Mali;
- 5) Furthermore, there is need to conduct AU-UN Joint Strategic Assessment on the security situation with a view to map out possible areas of intervention including the deployment of more troops in the Sahel;
- 6) The need to address the underlying structural conditions including poverty, human rights, rule of law, inclusive governance, socio economic challenges affecting the people of the region to enhance sustainable peace and security in the affected countries and within the region as a whole.

In conclusion, chair, though the situation in the Sahel remains fluid and unpredictable, the is hope for sustainable peace and security to return to the region through the collaboration and cooperation of all relevant actors and stakeholders. In that regard, let me express my appreciation to the AU, the PSC in particular and the International Community for the unwavering support to stabilization efforts of the Sahel Region.

Finally, my delegation endorsed the outcome of this session.

**I thank you for your kind attention.**



## VI. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

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*Statement delivered by Ambassador Victor Adekele, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of the Nigeria to the African Union*

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### **Chairperson,**

Thank you for giving Nigeria the floor.

1. On behalf of Nigeria, I wish to congratulate Your Excellency, Ambassador Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo for assuming the leadership of this Council for the month of June 2022. Let me assure you of the full cooperation and support of the Nigerian delegation throughout the tenure of your chairmanship.
2. Distinguished Chairperson, let me also thank you for convening this important briefing on the situation in the Sahel. In addition, we appreciate all the briefers for their insightful presentations on this topic.

### **Excellencies,**

3. Since the regime shift in Libya and the subsequent uprising in Northern Mali in 2012, the security situation in the Sahel region has gone from bad to worse. Armed groups have multiplied and violence has continued to spread in many parts of the Sahel.
4. In the last one year, Africa has witnessed several unconstitutional changes of government, most of which took place in the Sahel region. Indeed, the security situation in these countries have played a major role in the current political crises of the region. Lack of state presence, poverty and unemployment has made it easy for armed groups to find new recruits in areas that had long been neglected.
5. Various sources, including the Global Terrorism Index 2022 show, steady increase in the *number of attacks* and *fatalities* from these attacks in the Sahel region. Incidents of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso increased from 191 in 2020 and to 216 in 2021, pushing the number of fatalities from 657 to 732. With 333 incidents, the attacks from terrorism in Mali increased by 56% in 2021 compared to 2020 and led to more than 100% increase in fatalities, representing the highest number of terrorist attacks and deaths in the last decade in Mali.
6. As devastating as these attacks are, they are in many cases a symptom of deeper, unresolved issues that plague the region including poverty, food insecurity, lack of job opportunities and climate change.

### **Excellencies, Distinguished Council Members,**

7. Indeed, climate change remains one of the major challenges that the countries in the Sahel region are facing. The UN estimates that 80 percent of the agricultural areas in the Sahel

belt are already affected by climate change. Food production is also on the decline and violence often forces farmers to flee conflict areas and closed roads and markets further exacerbates food insecurity.

8. Despite the efforts of the G5 Sahel in addressing the security situation in the region, my delegation remains concerned by the recent developments in the security architecture in the region. The decision of Mali on May 15, 2022 to withdraw from all G5 Sahel bodies, citing internal challenges that prevented the transfer of the organization's current presidency to Mali in February 2022 as well as withdrawal of the French operation Barkhane forces from Mali have weakened the capacity of the Malian forces to respond to the security situation in the region and by extension other armed forces in the region seized with maintaining security.

9. In this connection, Nigeria calls for the revitalization of regional security cooperation and collaboration mechanisms, particularly the Nouakchott Process. We also urge countries in the region to prioritize security within the Sahel.

**Excellencies,**

10. As a delegation, we are also aware of the rising humanitarian emergencies in the region as a result of the political and security situation in the Sahel. We strongly support the ongoing efforts to reach a consensus on the transition timeframe between Mali and ECOWAS, allowing for the gradual lifting of sanctions in the country, this we believe will ease some of the humanitarian concerns in the region.

11. Nigeria also believes that there is need to prioritize the stabilization efforts in the Sahel. We urge the Commission to ensure due consultations with relevant decision-making bodies of the G5 Sahel and ECOWAS on the deployment of 3000 Troops to the Sahel. In addition, we urge the Commission to finalize the revision of the AU strategy for the Sahel region as soon as the Joint Strategic Assessment is adopted, work towards the strengthening of AU's presence through MISAHHEL, including the provision of adequate resources to implement its mandate, and monitor ongoing transitions.

12. **I thank you.**

## VII. REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

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### *Intervention*

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1. I thank you Chair, for the excellent manner within which you are chairing this meeting. We congratulate you on assuming the Chairship for the month of June and wish you well.
2. We take note of all the reports, and the statements that have been made.
3. Despite the efforts being deployed by Member States in preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, this scourge continues to pose serious threats to peace, security, and stability in some parts of the continent.
4. In his report to the 16<sup>th</sup> Extra Ordinary Assembly of the Union, H.E the President of Algeria and AU Champion on the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism noted, that there are many factors that make it difficult for the effective and efficient prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent. These include: Multiplicity and Redundancy of Initiatives, Mechanisms and Programs; Huge Reliance on Partner Funding, Partner Support, Partner Assistance and Increasingly Foreign Military Intervention; all of which have contributed to increased foreign interference and weakened national sovereignty.
5. We are deeply concerned about the dire security, economic and humanitarian situation evolving in the Sahel region. According to the UNHCR there are over 4m refugees and IDPs in the Sahel. Burkina Faso alone, has reported 1.8m IDPs; with over 4,148 closed schools affecting 685,935 students.
6. Your Excellency, we take note of the recommendations proposed in the concept note and wish to emphasize the following:
  - (i) On the issue of time frames for the political transitions: We fully support the efforts of ECOWAS in addressing the situation in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso. It is important that all key stakeholders, without apriori exclusion, are part of a comprehensive, inclusive and participatory national process.
  - (ii) On the issue of sanctions as reflected in Para 2&4 of the concept Note: In our view the imposition of sanctions is intended as a deterrent against unconstitutional changes of power. It is aimed at ensuring that ascension to the Highest Office, must be subject to the already established constitutional order and ultimately subject to will of the People, through elections. A premature lifting of sanctions without meeting this objective might send a wrong signal, that anyone, who fails to win an election, can secure the highest office through a coup d'état. In any case, this situation should never have been allowed to take place in the first place, had we taken pre-emptive measures at the time. That said, we support the call for the Commission and the International Community

to support the countries in the Sahel, in particular Mali and Burkina Faso in dealing with the humanitarian situation.

- (iii) We support the call for the conclusion of an Agreement between **Mali** and ECOWAS on the return to constitutional order and further support inter-Malian dialogue initiatives aimed at promoting consensus on the reforms to be undertaken to build confidence in the upcoming electoral process
- (iv) We urge the transitional authorities in **Guinea** to expedite the establishment of a transitional timetable and clarify the priority actions of government entities.
- (v) On the withdrawal of Mali from the G5 Sahel: We urge the G5 Sahel Countries to exercise restraint with the view to overcoming any disagreements that stand in the way of addressing common security and development challenges of their respective countries. Any divisions can only be detrimental to the whole region. All energies ought to be invested in fighting as a cohesive and united force against the existential threat of terrorism. We therefore call upon the Chairperson of the AU Commission to use his Good Offices in this regard.
- (vi) On the call for the deployment of the 3000 troops: This should be considered in view of the broader ambition of financing Peace Support Operations in Africa. In our view the force should have a Chapter Seven Security Council mandate and obligatory funding. That said, however, as long as the Union does not find a sustainable and predictable way of funding its Peace Support Operations, it is likely, we may not be able to preserve the gains made thus far, and or, achieve the aspirations enshrined in Agenda 2063.
- (vii) As we observed yesterday, there is need for Africa to build strong and professional armies which are equipped with the correct ideology of Non-Sectarianism; Pan-Africanism; and Nationalism, in order to defeat terrorism
- (viii) There is need to address the underlying root causes and drivers associated with Youth participation in violence including redressing the socio-economic imbalances that exist, through establishing deliberate socio-economic programs aimed at economically empowering our people, especially the Women and Youth and ushering them, into the money economy
- (ix) We support the call for the Commission to finalize the revision of the AU strategy for the Sahel region and work towards strengthening AU's presence through MISAHHEL, including the provision of adequate resources to implement its mandate, and monitor ongoing transitions; and
- (x) We commend the efforts of the AU-UN-ECOWAS-G5 Sahel Joint Strategic Assessment on Governance and Security in the Sahel and call for the requisite political, financial and technical support for the implementation of the initiative.

**I thank you.**

## VIII. REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

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### *Statement*

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#### **Chairperson,**

It is befitting that on behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Zimbabwe, I convey to the Republic of Congo in particular to H. E. Ambassador D. Awossa our warm congratulations for assuming the Chair of the Peace and Security Council for the month of June, 2022. We assure you, Chairperson of Zimbabwe's outmost support. It is through you, with the collaboration of the Council that, today we collectively join hands in this deserving attempt to understand and proffer possible solutions to the multidimensional and complex situation evolving in the Sahel. We extend our gratitude for the comprehensive and thorough briefings that we received this morning.

We have been adequately informed on the prevailing situation in the Sahel and the regional, continental and international measures that have been deployed to turn around the situation. It is with deep concern that the political and socio-economic situation in the Sahel continues to deteriorate despite these concerted efforts. The interplay between the conflict, violence and worsening humanitarian situation deserves the refinement of our strategy in a manner that should deliver tangible outcomes for the entire Sahel region to return to normalcy. We cannot allow the Sahel to be the epi-center of terrorism on our continent.

#### **Chairperson,**

The increasing levels of political volatility in the Sahel deserves a revised and thorough articulation of the causal factors to enable the Council to identify and deploy the appropriate responses. The objective should be to ensure that stability and peace returns to the Sahel, a condition we need to address all the other negative factors affecting the region. It is therefore necessary that beyond the military efforts we have and intend to deploy, we should sharpen our diplomatic interaction to reach out to all concerned for a common approach to the conflict in the Sahel. We equally need the support of our partners in general, and the United Nations, in particular, to ensure consistency and unity of purpose to find a lasting solution. We cannot afford to work at cross-purposes.

Let us adopt the necessary adjustments to our strategies to effectively address the conflict in the Sahel. We should remain guided by the best for the people of the Sahel and the region's sustainable development, itself being a critical component towards achieving the Africa We Want.

**I thank you!!**

African Union Commission (AUC)

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PSC Outcomes

Communiqués

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2022-06-01

# Communiqué of the 1087th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Held on 1 June 2022 on the Situation in the Sahel.

Peace and Security Council

African Union Commission

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